Section 243 and Bootstrap Sales: The Dilemma of the Corporate Shareholder by Cannada, Don B.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 31 
Issue 5 Issue 5 - October 1978 Article 5 
10-1978 
Section 243 and Bootstrap Sales: The Dilemma of the Corporate 
Shareholder 
Don B. Cannada 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Commercial Law Commons, and the Tax Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Don B. Cannada, Section 243 and Bootstrap Sales: The Dilemma of the Corporate Shareholder, 31 
Vanderbilt Law Review 1255 (1978) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol31/iss5/5 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
Section 243 and Bootstrap Sales: The
Dilemma of the Corporate Shareholder
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION . ................................. 1255
II. THE TAX TREATMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL SELLER IN
A BOOTSTRAP SALE . ............................. 1259
A. The Redemption Route: Zenz v. Quinlivan ...... 1259
B. The Dividend Route: Steel Improvement and
C asner ........... ....................... 1260
III. THE TAX TREATMENT OF THE CORPORATE SELLER IN A
BOOTSTRAP SALE ............................... 1264
A. Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Commissioner ... 1264
B. Basic Inc. v. United States .................. 1266
C. TSN Liquidating Corp. v. United States ....... 1269
IV. A LEGAL AND POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE CORPORATE
BOOTSTRAP SALE ... ............................ 1271
A. A Conceptual Approach to Dividends .......... 1271
(1) The Elevation of Form over Substance .... 1271
(2) Dividends and the Business Purpose Doc-
trine ................................. 1274
B. Section 243 and Tax Avoidance .............. 1276
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS .......................... .1281
A. Uniform Tax Treatment for Dividends and Re-
demptions ............................. 1281
B. Adjustment of Stock Basis for Distributions from
Pre-Acquisition Earnings and Profits ......... 1282
VI. CONCLUSION .. ......................... ...... .1284
I. INTRODUCTION
A party seeking to acquire an interest in a closely held corpora-
tion may be unable to pay the full market value of the stock or may
not desire to purchase all of the assets owned by the corporation. In
these situations the corporation can expedite the sale either by re-
deeming a portion of the selling shareholder's stock or distributing
a dividend prior to sale. The price the buyer must pay for the corpo-
ration's stock may then be reduced by an amount equal to the
decrease in the net worth of the corporation resulting from the re-
demption or dividend. These transactions are known as "bootstrap"
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stock acquisitions because the purchased corporation makes a dis-
tribution to assist the purchaser in financing the acquisition.1
Although dividends and redemptions produce equivalent eco-
nomic results in bootstrap acquistions, the tax treatment of parties
participating in such acquisitions often turns upon which form of
distribution the parties decide to utilize. The courts have recog-
nized, however, that the two principal tax questions arising in re-
demption cases and dividend cases are basically identical. The first
question is whether the corporate distribution is to be taxed to the
seller as a dividend or as a payment received in exchange for stock.
The second question is whether the corporate distribution to the
seller should be treated as a constructive dividend to the purchaser.
2
The diverse tax consequences that may result from a bootstrap
transaction are best illustrated by means of an example. Assume
that X corporation is wholly owned by an individual, shareholder
A. X has earnings and profits of $900 and a basis in its assets of
$1000. A's basis in the stock of X is $100. Now suppose that a buyer
would pay $2000 for either the stock or the assets of X, but that a
sale of the assets is not possible for business reasons. If no bootstrap
is effected, A will realize capital gain of $1900 on the sale of stock
(amount realized of $2000 less adjusted basis of $100). The buyer,
however, may be unable to pay the full purchase price and may
request that A agree to a bootstrap sale in which X corporation
distributes $900 to A and the purchase price is reduced to $1100.
From an economic viewpoint, A will be indifferent to the form
adopted for the transaction because both alternatives provide him
with the $2000 sale price. From a tax standpoint, however, a boot-
strap sale may result in disaster to the selling shareholder if the
distribution is characterized as a dividend rather than a redemp-
tion. If the distribution is designated as a redemption, the selling
shareholder can qualify for sale or exchange treatment,3 thereby
achieving the same tax consequences as in a nonbootstrap sale. A
determination that the distribution constitutes a dividend to the
seller, however, denies him this tax equivalence because the divi-
dend will be taxed at ordinary rates instead of the more favorable
1. See generally B. BIxrE & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS 9.25 at 9-28 (3d ed. 1971).
2. Jassy, The Tax Treatment of Bootstrap Stock Acquisitions: The Redemption Route
vs. the Dividend Route, 87 HARV. L. Rv. 1459, 1460 (1974).
3. Under § 302(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, a redemption distribution will
be treated as payment in exchange for stock if it is (1) not essentially equivalent to a dividend,
(2) substantially disproportionate with respect to the shareholder, or (3) in complete redemp-
tion of all the stock of the corporation owned by the shareholder.
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capital gain rate used for the sale or exchange of a capital asset.'
Consequently, individual shareholders will seek redemption treat-
ment and avoid dividend treatment. Finally, if the distribution is
taxed as a constructive dividend to the buyer, the most undesirable
tax consequences will result. The buyer will be taxed at ordinary
rates on a $900 dividend that he never actually receives, and the
seller will be taxed on a capital gain of $1900. Thus the feasibility
of a bootstrap sale by an individual shareholder depends primarily
on the availability of capital gain treatment to the seller in a re-
demptive distribution and the avoidance of constructive dividend
treatment to the buyer.
The tax goal sought by a corporate shareholder in structuring
a bootstrap sale represents the converse of the tax treatment sought
by an individual shareholder. Unlike the individual shareholder,
who shuns dividends in favor of the captial gain treatment obtain-
able through a redemption, a corporate shareholder prefers a divi-
dend distribution over a redemptive distribution. This preference
stems from the provisions of section 243 of the Internal Revenue
Code, which effectively eliminate the income tax on dividends paid
to corporate shareholders by allowing the corporation to deduct ei-
ther eighty-five or one hundred percent of the amount of the inter-
corporate dividend received.5
If the facts of the previous example are modified so that A is a
corporation and X is A's wholly owned subsidiary, A ordinarily will
prefer a sale of X's assets over a sale of X's stock. By effecting a sale
of assets, X can receive the same purchase price that A would re-
ceive in a stock sale and, at the same time, take advantage of its
higher adjusted basis in its assets to report less taxable gain on the
sale. X then can be liquidated without further tax by distributing
the proceeds of the sale to A.' Thus the parent corporation will
ultimately receive $2000 while the total taxable gain on the transac-
4. I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(7), 64, 1201(b).
5. I.R.C. § 243 states in pertinent part:
Dividends received by corporations.
(a) General rule.-In the case of a corporation, there shall be allowed as a deduction
an amount equal to the following percentages of the amount received as dividends from
a domestic corporation which is subject to taxation under this chapter:
(1) 85 percent in the case of dividends other than dividends described in
paragraph (2) or (3);
(2) 100 percent, in the case of dividends received by a small business invest-
ment company operating under the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 (15
U.S.C. 661 and following); and
(3) 100 percent, in the case of qualifying dividends (as defined in subsection
(b)(1)).
6. I.R.C. § 332.
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tion is only $1000 (amount realized of $2000 less adjusted basis of
$1000). In some situations, however, a sale of assets is impractical
because the subsidiary holds specific assets that cannot be trans-
ferred or that the buyer refuses to purchase. This inability to sell
assets, coupled with the parent's recognition that its basis in the
subsidiary's stock is lower than the subsidiary's basis in the assets,
might result in the payment of a dividend to the parent by the
subsidiary prior to the sale of stock. This transaction not only will
allow the parent to deduct the dividend under section 243, but will
also create a corporation bootstrap sale,7 because the price the buyer
must pay for the stock will be reduced by the amount of the divi-
dend. Unless the parent and the subsidiary file consolidated re-
turns, the dividend will have no effect on the parent's basis in the
stock. Thus, although a dividend bootstrap will provide the parent
with the same economic consideration it would receive in a sale of
stock with no accompanying dividend, the bootstrap reduces the
parent's income tax on the sale since a lower sale price and an
unchanged basis produce less taxable gain.
This result can be illustrated by means of the previous exam-
ple. A direct sale of stock with no accompanying dividend will cause
the parent to realize a gain of $1900 (amount realized of $2000 less
adjusted basis of $100). If X first declares a dividend of $900 to A,
however, A can escape taxation on the dividend under section 243
and reduce the sale price of the stock to $1100 ($2000 original sale
price less the $900 dividend no longer an asset of X corporation). A
will receive $2000 (the sum of the $900 dividend and the $1100 sale
price), but its taxable gain will be only $1000 (amount realized of
$1100 less adjusted basis of $100). Thus A will pay the same tax as
in a sale of assets.
Although the payment of a tax-free dividend to a corporate
shareholder prior to the shareholder's sale of its stock in the subsidi-
ary meets the literal requirements of section 243, the Internal Reve-
nue Service may deny the use of section 243 under one of two theo-
ries. First, the Service might contend that the distribution to the
seller is not a real dividend, but a conduit payment from the buyer
through the subsidiary, and therefore taxable to the parent as part
of the purchase price. Alternatively, the Service can argue that the
dividend first was constructively paid to the buyer and then paid
by the buyer to the seller as part of the purchase price. This second
7. The situation in which a corporate shareholder utilizes a dividend distribution from
its subsidiary to facilitate a sale of the subsidiary's stock shall be referred to in this Note as
a "corporate bootstrap sale."
[Vol.31:12551258
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interpretation poses a particularly dangerous trap in using a section
243 corporate bootstrap because a single distribution is taxed
twice-first as a constructive dividend to the buyer and then to the
seller as part of the purchase price.
The differences in the tax treatment of dividends and redemp-
tions, the tax goals of individual and corporate shareholders, and
the characterizations given corporate distributions by the Internal
Revenue Service and the courts have combined to create over-
whelming confusion for corporate bootstrap sales. The purpose of
this Note is to formulate a rational, consistent approach to the tax
treatment of corporate bootstrap sales. Accordingly, this Note ini-
tially will discuss various lines of cases governing the possible tax
treatment of the seller in a bootstrap acquisition. Special emphasis
will be placed on the recent line of cases that deny section 243
intercorporate dividend treatment to a parent corporation selling
the stock of a subsidiary. The rationale of these corporate bootstrap
cases will be challenged on both legal and policy grounds. Finally,
this Note will propose that a parent should be permitted to receive
a tax-free intercorporate dividend in an amount not in excess of its
allocable portion of the undistributed after-tax income reported by
the subsidiary since the parent's acquisition of control.
I. THE TAX TREATMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL SELLER IN A BOOTSTRAP
SALE
A. The Redemption Route: Zenz v. Quinlivan
In the celebrated pre-1954 Code decision of Zenz v. Quinlivan,5
the Sixth Circuit established a safe harbor for taxpayers attempting
to negotiate a bootstrap sale. In Zenz the taxpayer sought to sell her
corporation to a competitor who did not want to purchase the poten-
tial taxable dividends represented by the accumulated earnings and
profits of the corporation. In order to avoid future taxation on these
earnings and profits, the buyer purchased part of the taxpayer's
stock for cash. Three weeks later the corporation redeemed the bal-
ance of the taxpayer's stock, utilizing substantially all of the accu-
mulated earnings and profits of the corporation. The Internal Reve-
nue Service contended that the redemption part of the transaction
constituted a dividend under section 115(g) of the 1939 Code.' It
8. 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954).
9. Although Zenz was decided under the 1939 Code, the Internal Revenue Service has
indicated that it will follow Zenz in cases arising under § 302(b)(3) of the 1954 code. See Rev.
Rul. 55-745, 1955-2 C.B. 223. See also Auto Fin. Co. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 416 (1955),
aff'd per curiam, 229 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1956); Tiffany v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 1443 (1951),
acq. 1957-1 C.B. 5.
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argued that the redemption of part of the seller's stock would have
been a dividend if it had preceded the sale of the remaining shares,
and that the result should be the same when the parties prearrange
a sale followed by a redemption. Rejecting this argument, the Sixth
Circuit refused to reverse the steps of the alleged sham transaction:
"[W]e are satisfied that where the taxpayer effects a redemption
which completely extinguishes the taxpayer's interest in the corpo-
ration, and does not retain any beneficial interest whatever, that
such transaction is not the equivalent of the distribution of a tax-
able dividend .... , 0
In addition to assuring a selling shareholder that a properly
planned sale-redemption bootstrap will generate capital gain rather
than dividend income, Zenz had a significant impact on other kinds
of bootstrap sales. The Zenz court's reference to "beneficial inter-
est" later became the Sixth Circuit's standard for economic sub-
stance in Steel Improvement & Forge Co. v. Commissioner, " which
dealt with a dividend-sale bootstrap. The element of economic ben-
efit also is evident in Casner v. Commissioner 2 and in the corporate
bootstrap cases. Furthermore, despite its reliance on economic sub-
stance, Zenz allowed form to rule over substance because it permit-
ted, but did not require, that distribution to a seller in a bootstrap
acquisition be characterized as a redemption. As a result, until the
issuance of the opinions in Steel Improvement and Casner, courts
displayed the same respect for form when a dividend was distrib-
uted to effect a bootstrap sale.
13
B. The Dividend Route: Steel Improvement and Casner
The stability that Zenz supplied to the tax treatment of sale-
redemption bootstraps has not been paralleled in the dividend-sale
bootstrap area. Circuit court opinions in Steel Improvement &
Forge Co. v. Commissioner4 and Casner v. Commissioner5 have
undermined the tax certainty that once existed with respect to
dividend-sale bootstraps. Prior to the issuance of these two deci-
sions, a transaction could be structured so that a dividend declared
10. 213 F.2d at 917.
11. 314 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1963), rev'g 36 T.C. 265 (1961). See notes 20-21 infra and
accompanying text.
12. 450 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'g in part and rev'g in part, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 535
(1969). See text accompanying note 25 infra.
13. Kingson, The Deep Structure of Taxation: Dividend Distributions, 85 YALE L.J.
861, 874 (1976); see, e.g., Television Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1960);
Wilson v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 976 (1957), aff'd per curiam, 255 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1958).
14. 314 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1963).
15. 450 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1971).
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to the selling shareholder after a contract of sale had been entered
into, but while the selling shareholder still retained control of the
corporation, was taxed solely as a dividend to the seller and not as
a constructive dividend to the purchaser. 6 Only if the distribution
reduced the purchase price that the buyer was contractually obli-
gated to pay was it taxed as a constructive dividend to the purchaser
and as part of the sale proceeds to the seller. 7 Consequently, by
structuring the transaction so that the purchaser's legal obligation
was not affected by the declaration of a dividend to the seller, par-
ties to a dividend-sale bootstrap as well as parties using a sale-
redemption bootstrap were able to rely on the form of the transac-
tion to obtain favorable tax treatment.
Steel Improvement was the first case to establish a change in
the law affecting dividend-sale bootstrap transactions. The tax-
payer in Steel Improvement was an American corporation that had
sold all the stock of its Canadian subsidiary. In order for the pur-
chaser of the stock to avoid a Canadian tax on distribution to it of
the subsidiary's accumulated earnings, the buyer negotiated to buy
the company without earnings. Accordingly, the sale contract pro-
vided that prior to closing the subsidiary would pay the parent a
dividend of $116,000. s Section 243 prohibited any deduction for
dividends paid by foreign corporations;' 9 nevertheless, the parent
consented to the dividend because it expected to receive a foreign
tax credit that would offset any federal tax on the distribution.
When the taxpayer determined that the foreign tax credit was
not available, it reversed the position taken on its return and
claimed that the $116,000 distribution constituted part of the pur-
chase price it had received on the sale of its subsidiary and was
therefore taxable at the lower capital gain rate. The Tax Court
upheld the Service's contention that the $116,000 constituted divi-
dend income to the seller because the distribution did not relieve
the purchaser of an obligation to pay a higher purchase price and
because the seller remained in full control of the corporation at the
16. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 1321 (1956); Coffey v. Commissioner,
14 T.C. 1410 (1950); Diehl v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 139 (1942), aff'd per curiam, 142 F.2d
449 (6th Cir. 1944); Estate of Koepenick v. Commissioner, 2 T.C.M. (CCH) 143 (1943).
17. See Miller v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 939
(1958); Wall v. United States, 164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1947). See generally Jassy, supra note
2, at 1469-70; Kingson, supra note 13, at 879-81.
18. The contract permitted the subsidiary to pay a dividend up to $180,000, and if the
dividend were less than $180,000, the purchase price was to be increased by the greater of
the difference between the dividend and $180,000 or $64,000.




time of the distribution. 20
The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the dividend was pro-
perly taxable to the party having beneficial ownership of the stock
at the time the dividend was declared. Despite the Tax Court's
findings, the court of appeals determined that the buyer had ac-
quired beneficial ownership of the stock before the dividend was
paid. The court reasoned that after the parties had signed the pur-
chase contract and fixed a purchase price, the buyer bore the oper-
ating risks of the business and stood to benefit from its profits.21
Accordingly, the court held that the dividend represented sale pro-
ceeds in the hands of the seller and constituted a constructive divi-
dend to the purchaser, even though the contract price was not re-
duced by the amount of the dividend. The court did not attempt to
distinguish earlier conflicting decisions or to explain the difference
between the results reached in Steel Improvement and Zenz.
The tendency to consider economic substance rather than form
in the taxation of dividend-sale bootstraps fully evolved in Casner
v. Commissioner, which scrutinized bootstrap acquisitions of two
separate corporations. Casner and other individual shareholders in
the two corporations were compelled to sell their stock to fellow
shareholders and third parties.2 The sellers desired to transfer the
stock at book value, but none of the prospective purchasers had
sufficient funds to pay that amount. In order to facilitate the sales
and furnish the sellers with as much cash as possible, the parties
decided to reduce the book value of each corporation by means of a
pro rata dividend distribution to all the shareholders of each corpo-
ration in an amount equal to each corporation's paid-in capital
surplus. The dividends were declared prior to the signing of any
binding stock purchase contracts but with an understanding that
the stock would be purchased at a price equal to its book value after
a reduction for the amount of the declared dividends. Transfer of
the control of the corporation occurred within several days of the
dividend declaration. Finally, in contemporaneous transactions, the
20. 36 T.C. 265, 273-75 (1961), rev'd, 314 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1963).
21. Without citing any authority, the court insisted that the taxation of dividends be
tested by economic substance:
[W]e . . . conclude that the disputed dividend is properly taxable as ordinary income
to the party having beneficial ownership of the stock at the time when the dividend is
established, it being that party who bears the operating risks of the business and stands
to benefit from profits or suffer detriment from losses.
314 F.2d at 98.
22. Casner was the principal shareholder of a corporation that had been granted a
Chevrolet dealership. At the urging of General Motors Corporation, he agreed to terminate
his participation in that company by selling his stock to fellow shareholders and the individu-
als selected to take over the dealership. 28 T.C.M. (CCH) at 537.
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shares were transferred, the pro rata dividends were distributed,
and payment was made for the stock.
The facts in Casner presented the Fifth Circuit with an ideal
opportunity to adopt the formalistic standards developed in pre-
vious dividend and redemption cases and thereby limit application
of the Steel Improvement rationale. 2s The purchasers never contrac-
tually obligated themselves to pay an additional amount equal to
the dividends distributed to the seller. Moreover, the dividends were
declared at a time when no binding stock purchase contracts ex-
isted. The transactions included stockholders receiving dividends
who neither sold nor purchased any stock. Significantly, because the
dividends were declared at a time when subsequent earnings of the
corporations would continue to affect the amount of the purchase
price to be paid for the subject shares, beneficial ownership would
not have passed to the purchasers under the principles set forth in
Steel Improvement. Relying on these factors, the Tax Court had
held that the distributions were taxable as dividends to their respec-
tive recipients, emphasizing that beneficial ownership remained
with the original shareholders on the date the dividends were de-
clared.
24
The Fifth Circuit reversed, however, and held that the distribu-
tions to both sellers and buyers were includable in the income of the
buyers. The court further held that the dividends received by the
selling shareholders constituted proceeds from the sale of the stock,
entitling them to capital gain treatment. Liberally citing cases in-
volving tax avoidance, the Casner court concluded that the eco-
nomic substance of the parties' multi-step plan was a sale of stock
that used cash distributions as a device to provide the purchasers
with sufficient cash to pay the full purchase price. Significantly, the
court buttressed its holding by noting that the buying shareholders
enjoyed "economic benefit" from the cash distributions in the form
of a reduction in book value and the receipt of cash needed to pay
for the stock.2 5 In view of the emphasis placed on form by previous
decisions concerning dividends and redemptions in bootstrap ac-
quisitions, Casner's reliance on economic substance and benefit
23. See notes 14-21 supra and accompanying text.
24. 28 T.C.M. (CCH) at 541. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the Tax
Court's findings as to the parties' intentions and found as a fact that the sales price for the
stock "was fixed at book value including paid.in capital surplus." 450 F.2d at 394 (emphasis
by the court). The Tax Court was probably correct, however, because the minutes of the
relevant board of directors meeting indicate that the agreed sale price was exclusive of the
paid-in capital surplus. 28 T.C.M. (CCH) at 539.
25. 450 F.2d at 399.
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marked a radical change in the tax analysis applied to dividend-sale
bootstraps.
26
Ill. THE TAX TREATMENT OF THE CORPORATE SELLER IN A BOOTSTRAP
SALE
A. Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Commissioner
Although the requirement that a bootstrap distribution exhibit
economic substance has been applied sparingly to individual share-
holders, the doctrine has met with unquestioned acceptance by
courts confronting bootstrap distributions to corporate sharehold-
ers. In Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Commissioner,27 the taxpayer
filed a consolidated federal income tax return with its two wholly
owned subsidiaries, Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corporation (Pan-
Atlantic) and Gulf Florida Terminal Company, Incorporated (Gulf
Florida). Waterman initially was offered $3,500,000 for the stock of
the two subsidiaries. Although Waterman's total tax basis in the
stock of the two subsidiaries was only $700,000, their net assets had
a total tax basis in excess of the price offered. Thus Waterman
preferred a sale of the subsidiaries' assets rather than their stock.
The buyer demanded a stock sale, however, in order to acquire Pan-
Atlantic's Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) certificate with-
out ICC approval.2 8 Consequently, Waterman rejected the buyer's
offer and counteroffered to sell the stock of the two companies for
$700,000 after payment of dividends by them to Waterman of
$2,800,000.29
The parties agreed to this arrangement, and on January 21,
1955, Pan-Atlantic declared and paid the dividend in the form of a
promissory note. Waterman immediately sold the stock of both
companies to McLean Securities Corporation (McLean), whose
principal shareholder (the buyer) guaranteed the promissory note
issued by Pan-Atlantic to Waterman. McLean and its principal
26. This departure from traditional dividend taxation analysis has only recently been
reflected in bootstrap cases involving individual shareholders decided since Casner. See, e.g.,
Walker v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1976); Kuper v. Commissioner, 533 F.2d 152
(5th Cir. 1976).
27. 430 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 939 (1971), rev'g 50 T.C. 650
(1968).
28. The buyer's control of another corporation holding an ICC certificate required that
he obtain ICC approval for the acquisition. Competitors strongly opposed the granting of an
additional ICC certificate to the buyer. To avoid the necessity of ICC approval, the buyer
decided to divest himself of control in the other corporation and acquire the stock instead of
the assets of Pan-Atlantic and Gulf Florida. 430 F.2d at 1187.
29. There was no dispute that Pan-Atlantic had earnings and profits of at least
$2,800,000 at the time of sale. 430 F.2d at 1189 n.10.
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shareholder then loaned Pan-Atlantic enough money to pay the note
it had just distributed to Waterman. Thus, within a ninety minute
period, Waterman had $3,500,000 in cash, all of which came from
the buyer, and the buyer had the stock of both subsidiaries.
The Commissioner viewed the execution and delivery of Pan-
Atlantic's note to Waterman as a sham, and urged that the
$2,800,000 be treated as a capital gain to Waterman rather than a
tax-free consolidated intercorporate dividend. The Tax Court up-
held the form of the transaction, however, noting that parties may
arrange the form of a stock sale transaction in order to reduce or
eliminate taxable income." Furthermore, the court stated that sub-
stance did not necessarily differ from form solely because an equiva-
lent result might have been accomplished by another method that
would have produced a higher tax. As a second ground for its hold-
ing, the Tax Court found that no actual acceptance or legally bind-
ing contract of sale occurred until after the dividend was declared
and the note delivered.3 1 Judge Tannenwald's dissent reasoned that
no real dividend had been paid because the essence of the transac-
tion was that Waterman received the original offer price of
$3,500,000 from funds supplied by the purchaser. 3
2
The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that in substance Pan-
Atlantic did not pay a dividend to Waterman, but acted as a con-
duit for the payment of the purchase price to Waterman. Finding
that the issuance of the dividend note prior to the signing of the
closing agreement was designed to conceal the true nature of the
transaction, Judge Wisdom concluded that the form used by parties
to a transaction was relatively unimportant.3 3 The court expressed
concern that:
A new horizon of tax avoidance opportunities would be opened by allowing
a tax free dividend . . . to result from the transaction here effected. Corpora-
tions with wholly-owned subsidiaries would be enabled, without difficulty, to
circumvent capital gains treatment through a pre-sale extraction of earnings
and profits. . . . [A] corporation could purchase another corporation at its
fair market value, receive its new subsidiary's earnings and profits in the form
of an inter-corporate dividend, sell the subsidiary, and then claim a loss on
the subsequent sale.3
30. 50 T.C. at 661-62.
31. 50 T.C. at 664-65. See generally United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338
U.S. 451 (1950).
32. 50 T.C. at 666 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting). Judge Tannenwald indicated that the
issue was not "to whom a conceded dividend should be taxable as such but rather whether
there was any dividend at all."
33. The Fifth Circuit stated: "We concentrate on what the parties did. The form of the
transaction used by the parties is relatively unimportant, for the true substance and effect
of their agreement was that McLean would pay $3,500,000 for all the assets, rights and
liabilities represented by the stock." 430 F.2d at 1195 (citations omitted).
34. Id. at 1195-96.
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Finally, the court in Waterman rejected the taxpayer's argu-
ment that the transaction possessed economic substance because of
the existence of a business purpose. Waterman contended that it
could have employed at least three other legitimate means of avoid-
ing the capital gain on its sale if ICC regulations had not prohibited
the buyer from acquiring assets.3 5 Judge Wisdom concluded that
although the ICC requirements mandated a stock purchase, they
did not make the issuance of a dividend necessary; the sale of stock
could have been consummated without declaring a dividend. "6
The Waterman court did not hold that a dividend will not be
allowed to reduce the seller's tax on the sale of stock, but rather held
that no dividend in fact had occurred .3 Thus Waterman did not
answer the question whether the payment of an actual dividend by
a subsidiary to its parent in conjunction with the sale of the subsidi-
ary's stock would be recognized. Despite Waterman's narrow hold-
ing, however, the court's concern with tax avoidance if corporations
selling their subsidiaries could reduce the gain on the sale by receiv-
ing an untaxed dividend applies equally to the situation in which a
dividend is actually paid. Thus, until the appearance in 1977 of
Basic Inc. v. United States3 and TSN Liquidating Corp. v. United
States, 3 the possibility that Waterman might be extended to de-
stroy the tax treatment sought by the payment of actual dividends
in corporate bootstrap acquisitions discouraged taxpayers from at-
tempting this method of tax reduction.
B. Basic Inc. v. United States
The possibilities suggested by Waterman became reality in
Basic Inc. v. United States.4' In Basic the taxpayer, Basic, owned
all the stock of the first-tier subsidiary, Falls Industries Incorpo-
rated (Falls), which in turn owned all of the second-tier subsidiary,
35. Waterman alleged that it could have liquidated its subsidiaries under §§ 332 and
334(b)(1) and then sold their assets, or sold their assets and then liquidated the subsidiaries
tax-free, or merged Pan-Atlantic into Waterman under § 368(a)(1)(A) and then sold its
assets. 50 T.C. at 660.
36. The Fifth Circuit noted:
[Tihere was no requirement imposed by the ICC for dividing the stock sale into two
parts. The only party that required the transaction to be cast as it was, was Waterman.
Once McLean divested himself of control of Trucking, he was free to pay $3,500,000 in
cash directly to Waterman without any necessity of using Pan-Atlantic as a conduit for
the payment of $2,800,000 in the guise of a "dividend."
430 F.2d at 1195.
37. Id. at 1196.
38. 549 F.2d 740 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
39. 77-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9741 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
40. 549 F.2d 740 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
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Basic Carbon Corporation (Carbon). When another corporation of-
fered to purchase the two subsidiaries' assets at a predetermined
price,4' Basic demanded additional compensation for the adverse
tax consequences of an asset sale.12 The buyer then negotiated a
purchase of the stock of both Falls and Carbon directly from Basic
at substantially the same price." This second proposal, which was
accepted by Basic, necessitated a transfer of the Carbon stock from
Falls to Basic as a dividend. Basic reported the distribution as a
dividend of $501,869.76, the adjusted basis of the Carbon stock in
the hands of Falls, and took the eighty-five percent dividends-
received deduction allowed by section 243.
The dividend in kind allowed Basic to take over Falls' basis in
the Carbon stock almost tax-free because of the section 243 deduc-
tion." This increased basis reduced the total gain on Basic's subse-
quent stock sale. The Internal Revenue Service characterized the
entire transaction as "a deal too good to be true. '45 Although the
stock distribution fit the literal requirements for a dividend, the
Service argued that for tax purposes there was really no dividend
at all. It asked the court to ignore the dividend and treat the trans-
ferred basis as part of Basic's gain on the sale of Falls and Carbon
stock.
41. Basic and the buyer, the Carborundum Company of Niagara Falls, New York, had
agreed upon a tentative purchase price of $3,935,000, plus an assurance from the buyer
guaranteeing the repayment by Carbon of $1,000,000 owed to Basic. 549 F.2d at 741-42.
42. The buyer first proposed to buy all the assets of Falls and Carbon. Basic responded
that the tentative price would have to be increased $265,000 because of the adverse tax
consequences of an asset sale and demanded indemnity for all additional taxes assessed
against it in excess of this amount. Id. at 742.
43. The buyer planned to liquidate promptly the two purchased corporations under § §
332 and 334(b)(2). To execute this plan, however, it was necessary for the buyer to purchase
the stock of both corporations directly from Basic. If the buyer simply purchased the stock
of Falls and then had Falls distribute its Carbon stock to the buyer as a dividend, Carbon
could not be liquidated under § 334(b)(2) because it would not have been acquired by
"purchase" within the meaning of § 334(b)(3)(A)(i). See I.R.C. § 301(d)(2)(B).
44. Section 301(d) of the Internal Revenue Code states that the basis of property re-
ceived as a dividend by a corporate shareholder is the lesser of the fair market value of the
property or the adjusted basis in the hands of the distributing corporation.
45. 549 F.2d at 745. One commentator has suggested that Congress could easily have
barred the very transaction consummated in Basic by making § 269 applicable; Basic unques-
tionably acquired "control" of Carbon for the "principal purpose" of "avoidance of Federal
income tax." However, Congress evidenced no such intention. S. REP. No. 627, 78th Cong.,
1st Sess. 60 (1943), 1944 C.B. 973, 1017-18, (dealing with the predecessor of § 269). The Senate
report stated:
A transfer within a controlled or affiliated group frequently occurs by a section [3321
liquidation or by a tax-free exchange under the reorganization or consolidated returns
provisions of law. . . [WIhile a section [3321 liquidation would change the form of
control into a more direct form, it could hardly result in the acquisition of control under
section [269]. Transfers within a controlled or affiliated group under the reorganization
or consolidated returns provisions of law are more often than not precisely the same as
section [332] liquidations in this respect.
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The Court of Claims, concerned with the taxpayer's essentially
tax-free receipt of basis, agreed with the Service." The court ini-
tially determined that no valid business purpose motivated the
transfer. Basic stressed that the stock transfer was necessary in
order to enable Basic to meet the purchaser's requirement that the
shares of both subsidiaries be purchased directly from the parent.
Although conceding that the transfer was necessary to effect the sale
by Basic, the court held that a business purpose of the selling share-
holder did not satisfy the business purpose requirement as to Falls
and required that Falls establish its own business purpose for the
transfer.47 Because Falls had declared a dividend of the Carbon
stock for business reasons of its parent rather than to serve its own
business interests, the dividend failed.48
The court also rejected Basic's argument that the distribution
had "independent significance," distinguishing its prior decision in
Dynamics Corp. of America v. United States.49 In Dynamics a sub-
sidiary tried unsuccessfully to sell an unneeded building in Novem-
ber 1957. Three months later it transferred the building to its parent
corporation, which had unutilized capital loss carryovers, and the
parent sold the building at a substantial gain within nine months.
The Service's attempt to reallocate the gain to the subsidiary under
section 482 failed." Despite its obvious tax motivation, the transac-
tion was upheld by the Court of Claims on the ground that the
46. The Court of Claims observed that "[niot only would this provide Basic with the
advantage of a transferred basis in the Carbon stock. . . but, more importantly, Basic would
obtain this transferred basis essentially tax free by virtue of the deduction allowed intercor-
porate dividends under Section 243(a)(1)." 549 F.2d at 744-45.
47. The Basic court stated this requirement as follows:
However, it is quite another matter to offer that same argument in explanation and
justification for the stock transfer that took place between Basic and Falls. The business
interests of Falls were distinct from those of its shareholder, Basic. Hence, it will not do
to invoke an explanation that has validity only as to Basic . . . . Indeed, if such an
explanation were sufficient then all manner of intermediate transfers could lay claim to
"business purpose" simply by showing some factual connection, no matter how remote,
to an otherwise legitimate transaction existing at the end of the line.
Id. at 745.
48. The Basic court determined that the transaction served the business purpose of
effecting the sale of a business and that this business purpose could be attributed only to the
selling corporation. Thus, although the transaction furthered Basic's business interests, no
business interest of Falls was served by the transfer.
49. 449 F.2d 402 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
50. Although the Service failed in Dynamics to reallocate under § 482 the gain derived
from property transferred by means of an intercorporate dividend, it has succeeded recently
in employing § 482 to combat tax avoidance attempts under § 243. See Northwestern Nat'l
Bank v. United States, 556 F.2d 889 (8th Cir. 1977) (charitable deduction of property received
as intercorporate dividend reallocated); Southern Bancorp. v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1022
(1977) (income from sale of United States Treasury notes distributed as intercorporate divi-
dend reallocated).
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parent's superior ability to manage the property and effect a sale
provided a valid business purpose. The Basic court cited the valid
business purpose and the time lapse of nine months between trans-
fer and sale of the property in Dynamics as evidence that the distri-
bution and sale in Dynamics were unconnected events, and there-
fore clearly distinguishable from those in Basic.
Thus Basic's requirement that even an actual dividend paid by
a subsidiary to its parent as part of a bootstrap sale must manifest
economic substance, resolved the issue never reached in Waterman.
Although this conclusion was not surprising in light of the
Waterman rationale, the Court of Claims' determination that a
business purpose of the subsidiary distributing the dividend satis-
fied the economic substance standard,5' while a business purpose of
the parent distributee did not, imposed a disturbingly rigid stan-
dard.5 2 Tax practitioners who questioned whether other courts
would adopt the strict view espoused in Basic were answered nine
months later when TSN Liquidating Corp. v. United States,' ad-
dressed this precise issue.
C. TSN Liquidating Corp. v. United States
In TSN the taxpayer corporation owned over ninety percent of
Community Life Insurance Company (CLIC). In 1969, negotiations
began between CLIC and Union Mutual Life Insurance Company
(Union Mutual) concerning the purchase of CLIC by Union Mutual.
Because much of CLIC's investment portfolio adversely affected its
ability to obtain licenses in other states, Union Mutual required
CLIC to dispose of specific securities.54 Consequently, on May 5,
1969, TSN and the other CLIC shareholders agreed to sell their
CLIC stock to Union Mutual at a purchase price that excluded the
value of the unwanted stock. Immediately thereafter, CLIC de-
clared and paid a dividend of these unwanted securities to existing
stockholders, 5 who then sold their CLIC stock to Union Mutual.56
51. See note 57 infra, and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., Ditkoff, Intercorporate Dividends and Legitimate Tax Avoidance, 4 J.
CORP. TAx. 5 (1977).
53. 77-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9741 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
54. The investment portfolio of CLIC was heavily oriented toward equity investments
in closely held over-the-counter securities that seriously affected CLIC's ability to obtain
licenses in various states. As early as 1968, CLIC had begun to seek a solution to its invest-
ment portfolio problem, but the court found that no definite plan was ever formulated. CLIC
tried unsuccessfully to get Union Mutual to take the entire investment portfolio.
55. CLIC could not sell the over-the-counter stocks that Union Mutual did not want,
because the stocks had been originally owned by the person who controlled TSN, its predeces-
sor, and CLIC.
56. Taxpayer reported its share of the sale price on the installment basis. It claimed
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The taxpayer reported its share of the dividend and claimed the
eighty-five percent dividends received deduction of section 243.11
Predictably, the Commissioner viewed the distribution as part of
the sale proceeds received by the taxpayer."
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas agreed that the distribution constituted proceeds from the
sale of CLIC stock by the taxpayer. Quoting extensively from
Waterman and Basic, the TSN court expressed concern that the
transaction could be used as a device to enable the seller to treat
extraordinary distributions on the eve of the sale of a corporation
as tax-free dividends. 9 The court summarily concluded that there
was no business reason for CLIC, as a corporation, to desire to clean
up its portfolio once the contract of sale had been signed. The court
then determined that the distribution's only benefit was to make
CLIC saleable and that this benefit inured to CLIC's shareholders
rather than to CLIC itself."
The reasoning used by the TSN court does not support its re-
sult. At all times before and after the sale, CLIC contemplated
engaging in the insurance business-a business it could conduct
more effectively after disposal of much of its investment portfolio.6 '
Therefore, even after the sale, CLIC's business needs mandated that
it dispose of these securities. Moreover, the court recognized that
securities law restrictions made a dividend in kind the only practical
means by which to transfer the stock.2 Thus the court's conclusion
an adjusted basis of $612,304, which was computed by subtracting the portion of the dividend
in excess of earnings and profits from its original basis in its CLIC stock of $1,082,230.
57. The value of the unwanted stocks was approximately $1.8 million. As a result of
the dividend, CLIC was left with assets totaling approximately $300,000. The taxpayer re-
ported its share of the dividend as $701,354.85 and realized a dividend to the extent of its
share of CLIC's earnings and profits of $231,429, but claimed an 85% dividends received
deduction. It then reduced its basis in the stock of CLIC by the portion of the distribution in
excess of earnings and profits.
58. By treating the distributions as payments for the stock in the year of sale, the
Commissioner denied taxpayer the use of the installment reporting method because more
than 30% of the proceeds were received in the year of sale.
59. 77-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 88,526. The court relied heavily on the Waterman rationale
that the dividends received deduction of § 243 should not be used as a device for tax avoid-
ance. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
60. The court's brief analysis stated:
There was no reason for CLIC, as a corporation itself, to desire after the contract of sale
was signed to clean up its portfolio. The only benefit to CLIC was that it made itself
saleable by declaring the dividend and divesting itself of its over-the-counter stock
portfolio. This benefit wds . . . not to CLIC itself, but, rather, to CLIC's shareholders
77-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 88,525.
61. The court expressly found that the makeup of CLIC's investment portfolio adversely
affected its ability to obtain licenses in other states. Id. at 88,523.
62. Id.
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that the transfer served only to benefit the parent by making CLIC
saleable is unconvincing. CLIC also realized a benefit because the
dividend eliminated the objectionable securities in its portfolio.
Despite the inadequacy of its reasoning, TSN constitutes an
important decision in the corporate bootstrap sale area. The deci-
sion reflects the concern expressed in Waterman that intercorporate
dividends distributed in connection with the sale of subsidiaries can
be used as a tax avoidance device. TSN also comports with Basic's
requirement that a dividend distributed in a corporate bootstrap
sale must serve a business purpose of the subsidiary rather than the
parent. Thus Waterman, Basic, and TSN present formidable obsta-
cles for parent corporations seeking to use intercorporate dividends
to facilitate the sale of a subsidiary. Each of these three decisions,
however, misconstrues the true nature of a dividend, especially an
intercorporate dividend, and therefore should not be regarded as
conclusively determining the tax treatment of a corporate bootstrap
sale.
IV. A LEGAL AND POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE CORPORATE BOOTSTRAP
SALE
A. A Conceptual Approach to Dividends
(1) The Elevation of Form over Substance
A dividend does not confer an economic benefit on its recipi-
ent. 3 A dividend distribution merely transfers part of the value
represented by the shareholder's ownership interest in the corpora-
tion out of corporate solution and into his personal possession. The
increase in the shareholder's personal assets is exactly offset by the
reduction in the value of his corporate interest, thus leaving his
overall net worth unchanged. A shareholder's net worth increases
only upon the realization of a profit by the corporation, not upon
the corporation's decision to distribute those profits. The unfortun-
ate tendency of the courts to link dividends with economic benefit
has served only to obscure the true nature of a dividend. 4
63. For an excellent discussion of the legal and economic consequences of dividend
distributions, see Kingson, supra note 13. See also Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
64. As one commentator has noted, the confusion of dividends with economic benefit
may result in part from the market behavior of widely owned stocks, because the price of
publicly traded shares often rises upon anticipation or declaration of an increased dividend.
Kingson, supra note 13, at 864 n.22. Tax cases, however, usually involve closely held corpora-
tions so that any distinction between corporate and shareholder control over funds narrows.
One indication that shareholders of closely held corporations in particular do not regard the
purported economic benefit of a dividend as worth its tax cost is the existence of the accumu-
lated earnings penalties imposed by §§ 531 and 541 of the Code. Id. at 864.
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In Wall v. United States'- the Fourth Circuit correctly per-
ceived what actually constitutes a dividend distribution. Wall in-
volved a shareholder of a corporation who had acquired all the stock
of the other shareholder in return for a promissory note in the
amount of the stock's fair market value. Instead of paying the note
himself, the debtor later surrendered the purchased stock to the
corporation in consideration of its paying his debt. The Fourth Cir-
cuit held that payment of the debtor's note was a dividend distribu-
tion to him."6 The court refused, however, to apply an "economic
benefit" analysis, thus rejecting the taxpayer's argument that the
usual dividend rule should not apply to him because he had not
received any economic benefit as a result of his purchase the corpo-
ration's subsequent redemption of those shares." The taxpayer
unquestionably did not receive any economic benefit from the cor-
poration's assumption of the debt and cancellation of the redeemed
shares because the gain that resulted from causing the corporation
to assume his debt was exactly offset by the loss in value of his solely
owned company, which had become indebted to a third party with-
out receiving any corresponding asset. The simple result of the
transaction was a transfer of assets out of corporate solution and a
corresponding increase in the amount of the shareholder's benefi-
cially owned assets outside corporate solution. Thus the Wall court
correctly determined that the true measure of a dividend is the
transfer of assets out of corporate solution, not any economic benefit
to the shareholder.
Because a shareholder realizes no economic benefit from a divi-
dend, dividends cannot display economic substance. Rather a divi-
dend is nothing more than a taxable event determined by the share-
holders' decision to increase the amount of their assets outside cor-
65. 164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1947).
66. The court reasoned that a third party's payment of a debt owed by the taxpayer:
is regarded as the same as if the money had been paid to the taxpayer and transmitted
by him to the creditor; and so if a corporation, instead of paying a dividend to a stock-
holder, pays a debt for him out of its surplus, it is the same for tax purposes as if the
corporation pays a dividend to a stockholder, and the stockholder then utilizes it to pay
his debt.
Id. at 464.
67. He further contended that any economic benefit could be measured only by waiting
until he disposed of the shares. To this argument the court responded:
While this statement may be true, it is entirely beside the point. We are not now
concerned with the broad question whether the business . . . will ultimately result to
his advantage and show a profit on his investment. . . , but with the much narrower
question whether in 1939 the taxpayer in legal effect received a dividend from the
corporation through the payment by it of the $5,000 note . . ..
Id. at 465.
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porate solution."' Thus the decision to declare or not to declare a
dividend is inherently one of form that is incapable of possessing
economic substance. Nevertheless, courts discuss whether or to
whom a dividend distribution has been made in terms of the eco-
nomic benefit received and the underlying substance of the transac-
tion." This attempt to attribute economic substance to what is only
a change in form of asset ownership is primarily responsible for
much of the legal confusion surrounding bootstrap acquisitions.
Because a dividend is a purely formal event having no economic
substance, the economic benefit rationale used in Steel
Improvement and Casner to characterize a dividend to the seller as
a constructive dividend to the buyer must be rejected. The realiza-
tion by a buyer of an indirect economic benefit in the form of a
reduced purchase price should not cause the buyer to recognize a
dividend when the form of the transaction is a dividend to the seller
that does not relieve the buyer of a contractual obligation. The
fallacy of attempting to use economic substance to impute the divi-
dend to the buyer becomes apparent when one realizes that the
distributions in these cases neither actually nor constructively in-
creased the buyers' assets. 0 Furthermore, despite the emphasis the
Steel Improvement and Casner opinions placed on the parties' tax
avoidance motives, the taxpayers easily could have achieved the
desired results under a Zenz sale-redemption plan. Logic dictates
that a court's acceptance of form in the sale-redemption area also
should extend to bootstrap sales preceded by a dividend.
Although none of the opinions in Waterman, Basic, and TSN
considered the possibility of imputing to the buyer the dividend
68. For an excellent early Supreme Court analysis adopting this definition of a divi-
dend, see Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
69. See notes 21, 25, 33, 47-48, 60 supra and accompanying text.
70. In a flagrant contradiction, the Fifth Circuit opinion in Casner admitted that:
[Tihe buying stockholders received the same benefit from the cash distributions as
would any other recipient of a dividend distribution. To suggest that the proper test is
whether the shareholders are better off economically after the cash distributions than
before is incorrect since no dividend distribution enlarges the net worth of the sharehold-
ers.
450 F.2d at 400. As one commentator has noted, recasting the form of a bootstrap acquisition
is particularly objectionable when it unexpectedly reallocates the tax burden. See Kingson,
supra note 13, at 891 n.122. The seller in Casner was apparently in a high tax bracket so that
his tax would be significantly increased by the receipt of a dividend rather than a capital gain;
nevertheless he agreed to receive a dividend. If the parties adjusted the sale price to reflect
the tax detriment to the seller, inclusion of the dividend in the buyer's income resulted in a
capital gain windfall to the seller. This concern clearly expressed in Commissioner v. Daniel-
son, 378 F.2d 771, 775 (3d Cir. 1967), which said that an attack based on substance "would
nullify the reasonably predictable tax consequences of the agreement. . . . If unsuccessful,
the buyer would lose a tax advantage it had paid the selling-taxpayers to acquire."
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paid to the corporate seller, the dangers posed by Steel
Improvement and Casner should not be overlooked in the corporate
bootstrap area. Application of this doctrine could produce the worst
of all possible worlds. The selling corporate shareholder would lose
its section 243 deduction and incur additional capital gain, while
the buyer would recognize dividend income on property never ac-
tually received. Happily for taxpayers, the Service has stated that
it will not follow the reasoning applied in Casner.71
(2) Dividends and the Business Purpose Doctrine
Although Waterman, Basic, and TSN refrained from applying
economic substance theory to tax a dividend paid to the seller as a
constructive dividend to the buyer, Basic and TSN nevertheless
invoked economic substance to disallow dividend treatment to the
seller under the business purpose doctrine. The business purpose
doctrine states that when the sole purpose of a transaction is tax
avoidance, the court will disregard form and give effect to the trans-
action's economic substance in order to deny the tax benefit
achieved by the transaction. If the tax avoidance is but an incident
to an otherwise valid business purpose, however, the court will rec-
ognize the legitimacy of the transaction.
7 2
Because a dividend has no economic substance and the choice
of form is ultimately that of the shareholders, "it is naive to suppose
that a corporation declares and pays a dividend without regard to
the shareholders' interests or that the distribution of a valuable
asset can ever benefit the corporate distributor itself. 7 3 Yet Basic
and TSN both held that a dividend must serve a valid business
purpose of the distributing corporation and that a valid business
purpose of its shareholders will not suffice.74 Accordingly, when the
71. Rev. Rul. 75-493, 1975-2 C.B. 109; Rev. Rul. 75-494, 1975-2 C.B. 109. This ruling
resulted from intense criticism of the Casner decision. This ruling indicates that the Service
will follow Casner now only in two situations: (1) when the buyer furnishes the distributed
funds, as in Waterman; and (2) when the dividend is paid after the signing of the purchase
contract, as in Steel Improvement. See Kingson, supra note 13, at 897; Schaffer & Gordon,
Taxing Intercorporate Dividends As Part of the Sale of a Subsidiary, 30 TAX. LAw. 727, 751-
52 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Schaffer & Gordon].
72. For two exhaustive discussions of the business purpose doctrine, see Lipnick,
Business Purpose and Income Taxes: From Gregory to Goldstein, 46 TAXES 698 (1968); Rice,
Judicial Techniques in Combating Tax Avoidance, 51 MICH. L. Rlv. 1021, 1041-47 (1953).
73. Ditkoff, supra note 52, at 19.
74. Many courts have recognized that it is not only difficult but often purely formalistic
to distinguish between corporate and shareholder benefit. See, e.g., Estate of Parshelsky v.
Commissioner, 303 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1962); Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646 (1st Cir.
1949); Survaunt v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1947); Bazley v. Commissioner, 155
F.2d 237 (3d Cir. 1946) (dissenting opinion). See generally Commissioner v. Morris Trust, 367
F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1966); Easson v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1961); Louisville
Store of Liberty, Ky. v. United States, 376 F.2d 314 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
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Basic court decided to apply this rigid standard to the facts before
it, the dividend in kind paid by the subsidiary to the parent was
disallowed because it served only a business purpose of the parent. 5
The similar result reached in TSN is even more questionable in view
of the conspicuous presence of a business purpose of the corporation
distributing the dividend."
The reasons why the courts in Basic and TSN adopted this
strict business purpose requirement cannot be easily ascertained. As
mentioned before, both practical and theoretical considerations in-
dicate that this standard provides an inappropriate method for test-
ing the validity of dividends distributed in corporate bootstrap
transactions." The harsh attitudes evidenced in Basic and TSN
cannot be explained by the facts of the two cases because neither
transaction constituted a blatant attempt at tax avoidance.7 8 The
courts' adoption of this unrealistic business purpose requirement for
section 243 bootstrap transactions and the subsequent misapplica-
tion of the test when it served to legitimate a section 243 bootstrap
sale indicate an underlying judicial concern that section 243 might
be used to achieve a degree of tax avoidance far exceeding that
achieved in Basic and TSN. This concern can be gleaned from the
concluding paragraph of the discussion in TSN,'79 in which the court
reiterated Waterman's apprehension that one corporation could
purchase another corporation at its fair market value, receive its
new subsidiary's earnings and profits tax-free under section 243, and
then sell the subsidiary, claiming a loss on the subsequent sale. 0
Thus the courts in Basic and TSN did not seem to view the specific
transactions in these cases as particularly outrageous means of tax
avoidance; instead, the harsh position adopted appears to stem
from a judicial fear that approval of these transactions would open
the floodgates and allow section 243 to be used by corporate taxpay-
ers to obtain obviously illegitimate tax benefits.8 '
75. See notes 47-48 supra and accompanying text.
76. See notes 61-62 supra and accompanying text.
77. See text accompanying note 73.
78. The courts in both Basic and TSN recognized that the bootstrap dividends issued
in each transaction served the primary purpose of effecting a sale of the subsidiaries involved,
since neither buyer would have consummated the purchase unless the dividends in kind had
been paid. The TSN court responded, however, that the business purpose doctrine may apply
even if tax avoidance is not the sole purpose for a transaction. 77-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 88,526.
79. Id. at 88,526-27.
80. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
81. The TSN opinion expressed this fear as follows:
Since all the parties to an arm's-length contract can, by offer, counter-offer, accept-
ance, and rejection, shape the terms of the contract so as to be most beneficial to all
the parties involved, no single party can be said to dictate any particular requirement.
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B. Section 243 and Tax Avoidance
Section 243 does not exempt corporate earnings from tax,82 but
it does prevent such earnings from being taxed more than once
before distribution to individual shareholders. 3 Thus section
243(a) (1) provides generally that eighty-five percent of the amount
received as dividends from a domestic corporation that is subject to
federal income taxation may be deducted when received by a corpo-
rate shareholder.8 4 The requirement that the paying corporation be
subject to federal income taxation reflects the deduction's purpose
of mitigating multiple taxation of corporate earnings. 5 For corpo-
rate groups that are eligible to file consolidated returns but elect to
report separately, section 243(a) (3) provides a one hundred percent
dividend deduction.
Waterman, Basic, and TSN recognized the purpose of section
243's policy of preventing multiple taxation. They did not compre-
hend, however, that when a corporate parent sells a subsidiary, the
subsidiary's earnings and profits, which have already been taxed
Were this Court to hold that a pre-sale extraction of capital was to be treated as a
dividend for federal taxation purposes whenever a prospective buyer "demanded" it, the
Court would be opening the door for all sorts of impenetrable contract collusion between
the parties.
77-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 85,526.
82. See note 5 supra.
83. See generally BrrTKER & EuSTcE, supra note 1, 5.06; Cohen, Election of Tax-Free
Intercorporate Dividends Under the Revenue Act of 1964, 42 TAXES 791 (1964).
84. Bittker and Eustice have observed:
From 1917 to 1935, corporations were not taxed on dividends received from other corpo-
rations, in order to prevent the multiple taxation of corporate earnings, as they passed
from one corporation to another, possibly within the same chain of beneficial ownership.
The law was revised in 1935, however, to exempt only 85 percent of the dividends
received, in order to discourage the use of multiple entities for tax avoidance and as a
part of the New Deal program which pressed for the simplification of elaborate corporate
structures.
BrrrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 1, 5.06, at 5-18.
85. The language of § 243 and its legislative history clearly indicate that the purpose
of the statute and regulations relieving intercorporate dividends from tax is to prevent multi-
ple taxation of corporate earnings: "There is no reason in the world why a corporation that
owns stock in another company should pay a double tax upon those holdings." 44 CONG. REC.
4696 (1909) (remarks of Representative Payne discussing the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of
1909); see H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1932) (Revenue Act of 1932). Cf. 55
CONG. REc. 2492-94 (1917) (remarks of Rep. Sterling discussing the Revenue Act of 1917); 78
CONG. REc. 6467-71 (1934) (remarks of Senators Borah and Black discussing the Revenue Act
of 1934) (congressional discussions leading to rejection of attempts to abolish the exemption
for intercorporate dividends). The Treasury agrees with this rationale: "[The proposed 100%
dividends-received deduction] would recognize that the earnings of an 80-percent owned-
operating subsidiary are more directly the earnings of the parent than is the case where one
corporation merely derives investment income from an unrelated corporation." Hearings on
the President's 1963 Tax Recommendations Before the House Ways and Means Comm., Pt.
1, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1963) (statement of C. Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury).
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once, will be taxed again in corporate solution if the parent is denied
a dividend deduction and must use its basis in the subsidiary's stock
to compute gain. Indeed, one can argue that the Code gives the
subsidiary a cost basis in its assets and exempts dividends to its
parent from tax for the same multiple tax-avoiding reason.86 The
subsidiary's basis in assets purchased with earnings and profits pre-
vents those earnings and profits from being taxed again if the sub-
sidiary sells the assets. Section 243 also prevents those earnings and
profits from being taxed again if the subsidiary distributes them as
a dividend.
For example, 7 assume that a parent pays $20 in exchange for
stock of a newly incorporated subsidiary and that the subsidiary
invests in assets with a basis of $20. The subsidiary then produces
after-tax income of $100, which is reinvested in assets with a basis
of $100. If the subsidiary sells its assets for $300, the first $120 of
proceeds will not be taxed. Only the $180 in excess of the subsidi-
ary's basis will be taxable gain. The undistributed earnings of $100,
already taxed once, will not be taxed again. Thus, under these cir-
cumstances, the assets' basis performs the function of assuring that
income is taxed only once.
Now assume that the parent must for business reasons sell
stock instead of assets. The purchase price is still $300, but the
parent's basis in the shares is $20 instead of $120. The gain therefore
will be $280 instead of $180. An amount equal to the subsidiary's
after-tax earnings of $100 is taxed again. It is this second tax on
$100, which is not imposed on a sale of assets by the subsidiary, that
the parent seeks to avoid by arranging with the buyer for the subsid-
iary to pay a dividend of $100 to the parent and for the buyer to pay
$100 less in purchase price. Thus logical reasoning supports the use
of section 243 to equate the corporate parent's gain on a sale of stock
with the gain the subsidiary would have on a sale of assets.
The consolidated return regulations,89 which govern taxable
86. Schaffer & Gordon, Taxing Intercorporate Dividends Received As Part of the Sale
of a Subsidiary 30 TAx LAW. 727 (1977).
87. This example is taken in substance from an example in Schaffer & Gordon, supra
note 71, at 735-36.
88. Note that it is impossible for an intercorporate dividend to reduce the seller's gain
below what the subsidiary's gain would have been on a sale of assets. In this example the
parent cannot reduce its gain below $180 because the subsidiary's distribution constitutes a
"dividend" only to the extent of the subsidiary's earnings and profits ($100). A distribution
exceeding the subsidiary's earnings and profits would not avoid any gain, since the parent
would be required to reduce its basis in the subsidiary's shares. If the distribution exceeded
both earnings and profits and the parent's basis in the subsidiary's shares the parent would
be required to recognize the amount of excess as gain. See id. at 736.
89. The Treasury has promulgated a lengthy and intricate set of regulations, which for
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years beginning after December 31, 1965,10 provide convincing sup-
port for this view. These regulations require a corporate parent that
files consolidated returns with its subsidiary to increase its basis in
its stock of the subsidiary by the amount of the subsidiary's undis-
tributed earnings and profits for the taxable year." The general
purpose underlying this adjustment is to reflect increases and de-
creases in the stock investment corresponding to the subsidiary's
results of operations that have been included in the consolidated
return, so that a subsequent sale or other distribution of such stock
will not result in tax duplication to the parent.2 For the parent
corporation the result is the same as if these earnings and profits
had been distributed to it as dividends and then contributed back
to the subsidiary's capital.9 3 If consolidated returns had been filed
in the previous example, the parent's basis in the stock of the sub-
sidiary would have been increased by the amount of the subsidiary's
undistributed earnings and profits ($100), and the parent's gain on
the sale of stock would have been identical to the gain produced by
a sale of assets.
Although eligible to file consolidated returns, the taxpayers in
Basic and TSN had not elected consolidated treatment but sought
to achieve a similar result by means of section 243.11 Because the
statutory purpose of both section 243 and the consolidated return
regulations is to avoid repeated taxation of corporate earnings until
practical purposes constitute the law of consolidated returns. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1501-.1504
(regulations in force as of May 1978). See generally BrrKcR & EusTicE, supra note 1, 15.20-
.24; F. PEEL, JR., CONSOLIDATED TAX RETuRNs (2d ed. 1973).
90. These consolidated return regulations were not in effect for the tax year 1955, in
which Waterman filed consolidated returns. Beginning in 1966 the regulations have required
that a corporate parent filing consolidated returns with its subsidiary increase its basis in its
stock of the subsidiary by the amount of the subsidiary's undistributed earnings and profits
for the taxable year. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1502-32(b)(1)(i) (1966); 1.1502-32(b)(2)(iii) (1966);
1.1502-32(c), T.D. 7246, 1973-1 C.B. 381, 390; 1.1502-32(e)(2) (1966). The parent decreases
its basis in the subsidiary's shares when the subsidiary distributes earnings and profits which
the subsidiary accumulated in previous consolidated return years, or in years before the
parent acquired the subsidiary.
Were the Waterman Steamship Company to sell its subsidiaries today, having consoli-
dated its return, it would have no gain. Its basis would not be the $700,000 realized under
the law in effect in 1955, but would be at least $2,800,000. There would not be gain even if
the exact holding of Waterman were repeated.
91. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32(b)(1)(i) (1966). See generally 1 H. LERNER, R. ANTES, R.
ROSEN, & B. FINKELSTEIN, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS FILING CONSOLIDATED
RErURNS (1976) [hereinafter cited as LERNER].
92. See PEEL, supra note 89, 15.02a, at 213; LERNER, supra note 91, at 21-22.
93. PEEL, supra note 89, 15.02a, at 215.
94. In order to file consolidated returns, a corporate group must meet § 1504's definition
of "affiliated group." The most important requirement that this definition imposes is that
the parent own at least 80% of the voting power of all classes of stock and of each class of
nonvoting stock of the subsidiary.
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they are transferred out of corporate form, sound tax policy dictates
that a corporation should not be subjected to double taxation solely
because it has elected not to file consolidated returns.', Indeed,
Congress has indicated that one of the purposes of section 243 is to
serve as a substitute for groups that do not elect to file consolidated
returns." Thus, although consolidated returns provide one means by
which gain on the sale of stock can be eliminated, there is no reason
why section 243 should not provide another method by which to
eliminate this same amount of gain.
In one situation, however, the application of section 243 would
not yield the same tax result provided by consolidation. 7 This
would occur when a corporation purchases another corporation at
fair market value, receives its new subsidiary's pre-acquisition earn-
ings and profits in the form of an intercorporate dividend, then sells
the subsidiary, and claims a loss on the subsequent sale. This is the
precise situation first envisioned by the Waterman court and later
viewed with alarm in TSN. "1 Under the consolidated return regula-
tions, the corporate purchaser could not utilize this device to create
an artificial tax loss. The present investment rules of the consoli-
dated return regulation require the parent's basis in the stock of the
subsidiary to be reduced for purposes of determining gain or loss
whenever the subsidiary makes a distribution of pre-affiliation earn-
ings and profits." The regulations assume that pre-affiliation earn-
ings and profits were reflected in the purchase price paid for the
stock and therefore constitute part of the basis of the stock.'00 Conse-
quently, a parent could not pay $100,000 for the stock of a subsidiary
with $60,000 in earnings and profits, receive the $60,000 as a divi-
dend in a consolidated return year (in which the dividend would be
95. There are many reasons why an affiliated group might prefer to file separate returns
rather than consolidated returns. See BrrrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 1, 15.23; Salem,
Proposed Section 243 Tax-Free Dividend Rules Answer Many, But Not All, Questions, 28 J.
TAx. 26 (1968); Schaffer & Gordon, supra note 86, at 739.
96. See Schaffer & Gordon, supra note 71, at 739-40. The Senate report on the 1964
legislation that repealed the penalty tax on affiliated groups filing consolidated returns
stated:
Your committee concluded that it would be inequitable to repeal the consolidated return
2-percent tax without also providing a 100-percent intercorporate dividends received
deduction for corporations meeting the same tests of common ownership, but which for
one reason or another cannot or do not want to, file a consolidated return ....
S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1964), 1964-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 579, reprinted in [1964]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1673, 1747.
97. See PEEL, supra note 89, 15.02b.
98. See notes 34 & 80 supra and accompanying text.
99. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32(b)(2), T.D. 7246, 1973-1 C.B. 381,390. See PEEL, supra note
89, 15.029, at 214.
100. See PEEL, supra note 89, 15.02a, at 214.
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eliminated), sell the stock for its remaining value of $40,000, and
claim a $60,000 loss. This artificial tax loss is also denied corpora-
tions electing the section 243 one hundred percent dividends re-
ceived deduction. Section 243(b)(1)(B) denies the one hundred per-
cent deduction to dividends out of earnings and profits of a taxable
year in which the distributing corporation and the corporation re-
ceiving the dividend were not members of an affiliated group.'0 '
The consolidated return regulations' basis adjustment for dis-
tributions of pre-acquisition earnings and profits and section
243(b)(1)(B)'s denial of a deduction for such dividends have no
functional equivalent in the eighty-five percent dividend deduction
provisions of section 243.112 If no consolidated returns are filed and
the one hundred percent dividends received deduction is not elected
by the parent in the above example, the parent could deduct eighty-
five percent of the $60,000 dividend and retain its $100,000 basis in
the subsidiary's stock. °3 The parent would succeed in creating a
potential $60,000 capital loss by paying a tax at ordinary income
rates on $9000 of the $60,000 dividend.1 4 This artificial tax loss
results because the parent's deduction of pre-acquisition earnings
and profits already reflected in the basis of the stock is not offset
by an equal reduction in the basis of the stock.
Thus the dilemma faced by the courts in Waterman, Basic, and
TSN is clear. No valid tax policy supports denying a corporation in
a bootstrap sale the use of section 243 to eliminate previously taxed
post-acquisition earnings and profits that are not reflected in the
basis of the subsidiary's assets. Certainly a corporate shareholder
101. I.R.C. § 243(b) states:
(b) Qualifying dividends.-
(1) Definition.-For purposes of subsection (a)(3), the term "qualifying
dividends" means dividends received by a corporation which, at the close of the
day the dividends are received, is a member of the same affiliated group of
corporations (as defined in paragraph (5)) as the corporation distributing the
dividends, if-
(A) such affiliated group has made an election under paragraph (2)
which is effective for the taxable years of its members which include such
day, and either
(B) such dividends are distributed out of earnings and profits of a
taxable year of the distributing corporation ending after December 31,
1963-
(i) on each day of which the distributing corporation and the
corporation receiving the dividends were members of such affili-
ated group ....
102. See PEEL, supra note 89, 15.02a, at 214, 15.02b, at 220.
103. I.R.C. §§ 243(a)(1), 301(d)(2).
104. The taxpayer corporation would be taxed only on the amount of the dividend in
excess of 85% (i.e., 15% of $60,000=$9,000). A capital loss of $60,000 would result when the
parent sells the stock at its remaining fair market value ($40,000).
1280 [Vol.31:1255
SECTION 243 AND BOOTSTRAP SALES
should be allowed to achieve the same tax results in a sale of stock
that a sale of assets or application of the consolidated return regula-
tions would produce. On the other hand, judicial approval of the use
of section 243 in corporate bootstrap sales might be tantamount to
recognition of its use as a tax avoidance device when the dividends
distributed arise out of pre-acquisition earnings and profits that
already are reflected in the basis of the stock.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. Uniform Tax Treatment of Dividends and Redemptions
It is clear that bootstrap sales have the same economic effect
whether accomplished by dividend or redemption. Nevertheless, the
parties are taxed differently depending on whether the transaction
includes a dividend or redemption. Neither of the possible tax treat-
ments of a dividend to the seller in a bootstrap sale (dividend to
seller and no income to buyer, or constructive dividend to buyer and
purchase price to seller) matches the tax treatment of the parties if
the seller causes a redemption (purchase price to seller, no income
to buyer). ' Consequently, well-advised sellers generally will pursue
the redemption route rather than the dividend route.
Everett Jassy has examined the economic similarity of redemp-
tion bootstraps and dividend bootstraps and has suggested a novel
reform.'"' Because the taxation of bootstrap sales by way of redemp-
tion appears settled in the courts, before the Service, and appar-
ently to the satisfaction of Congress, Jassy advocates that bootstrap
sales by way of dividends should be taxed as if they were by way of
redemption. Under this proposal, buyers would be spared the expen-
sive surprise of Casner and sellers would be taxed the same whether
the seller receives corporate funds by means of redemption or divi-
dend.'07
Although this proposal provides a simple and conceptually ap-
pealing solution to the problems raised by Steel Improvement and
Casner, it contains two serious defects. Jassy concedes that the
courts are not likely to accept his proposal.0 8 Rather, the courts
have consistently refused to look beyond the shareholder's charac-
105. Professor Kingson has suggested that courts use the rule of Commissioner v. Court
Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945), in deciding whether the dividend is taxed to the buyer or
the seller. See Kingson, supra note 13, at 881-84. The formalistic nature of the rule and its
inequitable application to corporate shareholders are criticized by Schaffer and Gordon,
supra note 86, at 754.
106. See Jassy, supra note 2.
107. Id. at 1477-81.
108. Id. at 1482-83.
19781 1281
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
terization of a distribution as a dividend in order to determine
whether the circumstances and economic effect of the distribution
properly require a different characterization for tax purposes.,"9 The
most important objection to Jassy's proposal is that it ignores the
case of the corporate seller."' Reclassifying dividends as capital
gains certainly benefits individual taxpayers. Corporate sellers,
however, prefer dividends that are deductible under section 243 over
redemptions that are taxable at capital gain rates.
As discussed above, there are compelling reasons why distribu-
tions from a subsidiary to its parent should be tax-free to the extent
of post-acquisition earnings and profits."'1 The application of section
243 accomplishes this. If a dividend is recharacterized as a redemp-
tion, however, the parent cannot rely on section 243 to achieve legit-
imate tax avoidance. The proposal to tax such dividends as redemp-
tions seems to have been made without consideration of the purpose
of section 243. Thus, this proposed reform should be limited to
sellers who are not corporations, or to dividends that do not qualify
for the dividends received deduction of section 243.
B. Adjustment of Stock Basis for Distributions from Pre-
Acquisition Earnings and Profits
When a parent decides to sell a subsidiary whose income pre-
viously has been taxed at the corporate level, a sale of assets will
not result in these earnings being taxed twice because the earnings
will be reflected in the basis of the assets acquired by the subsidiary
with after-tax earnings. If the parent decides to sell stock instead
of assets, however, the basis of the stock will not have been in-
creased by the amount of after-tax income earned by the subsidiary
subsequent to the parent's purchase of the stock. Consequently,
unless the parent is allowed an essentially tax-free receipt of the
amount of previously taxed income that is not reflected in the
stock's basis, the income earned by the subsidiary will be subjected
109. In Reitz v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 443 (1974), a dividend was declared just prior
to a gift of the stock by the shareholders. The shareholders argued that the transaction should
be treated as a redemption of part of their stock. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's
assertion of dividend treatment to the taxpayers, stating:
Perhaps petitioners could have fashioned the transaction as a sale, a redemption and
gift, or a liquidation and gift. Instead they arranged a dividend followed by a gift. Of
course, petitioners were entitled to choose the most favorable arrangement. But having
chosen the method they did for accomplishing their goals, petitioners are bound by their
choice.
Id. at 449 (citations omitted).
110. Schaffer & Gordon, supra note 86, at 756.
111. See notes 85-96 supra and accompanying text.
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to taxation twice before leaving corporate solution. On the other
hand, a parent should not be allowed to purchase the stock of an-
other corporation whose pre-acquisition earnings and profits are re-
flected in the cost of the stock, declare a tax-free dividend of these
pre-acquisition earnings, and then manufacture a loss by immedi-
ately selling the stock. Thus a rule is needed that will allow the
receipt of a legitimate, tax-free dividend in the first situation, while
denying tax-free treatment to the illegitimate method of tax avoid-
ance attempted in the second situation.
It is submitted that both of these objectives can be achieved
under the following rule: When a parent sells the stock of a subsidi-
ary it may treat an amount (not exceeding the total gain on the sale)
equal to its allocable share of the subsidiary's undistributed earn-
ings and profits as a section 243 dividend, provided that it agrees
to reduce its basis in the stock of the subsidiary by an amount equal
to its allocable share of the subsidiary's pre-acquisition earnings and
profits. Under this proposal a corporation selling stock would be
permitted to deduct section 243 dividends out of the subsidiary's
earnings and profits that are not reflected in the stock's basis. This
rule would result in equal tax treatment for sales of stock and sales
of assets. Moreover, the requirement that the parent reduce its basis
in the stock by the amount of pre-acquisition earnings and profits
already reflected in the basis of the stock eliminates the possibility
that a parent will be able to construct an artificial tax loss under
section 243.112
This rule adopts the theory used by the consolidated return
regulation to solve the problems posed by corporate bootstrap
sales."3 Essentially, the objective of this proposed rule is to achieve
more exact justice in the treatment of dividends than is currently
provided by the Internal Revenue Code. Unlike this proposal and
the consolidated return regulations, section 243 generally ignores
the relationship between the period of stock ownership and the pe-
riod of accumulation of earnings and profits."4 Consequently, sec-
112. Ideally, this suggested adjustment to the parent's basis in a subsidiary's stock
should apply in the case of any stock held by a corporate shareholder. The problems of
allocation are sufficiently complex, however, to warrant a limitation on the rule. The adjust-
ment probably should be made available only to corporations owning more than 50% of the
stock of another corporation.
Suggestions similar to the rule proposed here have been made by other commentators.
See Blum, Taxing the Corporate Shareholder-Some Old Problems Reconsidered, 53 TAXES
217, 219 (1975); Cohen, Surrey, Tarleau, & Warren, A Technical Revision of the Federal
Income Tax Treatment of Corporate Distributions to Shareholders, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 49
(1952).
113. See text accompanying notes 99-100 supra.
114. See PEEL, supra note 89, T 15.02a, at 214.
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tion 243 contains no provision preventing the original cost basis of
the stock of a subsidiary from being used even though the subsidiary
has distributed dividends out of pre-acquisition earnings that pre-
sumably were reflected in the price paid for the stock. It was this
loophole that caused the courts in Waterman and TSN to place
severe restrictions on the use of section 243 in bootstrap sales. A
legislative incorporation of the proposed rule into section 243 would
prevent use of the dividends received deduction to achieve the illegi-
timate tax avoidance envisioned in Waterman and TSN and would
provide equivalent tax treatment in a sale of stock and a sale of
assets.
VI. CONCLUSION
Waterman, Basic, and TSN present substantial obstacles for a
corporate taxpayer attempting to deduct intercorporate dividends
received in connection with a bootstrap sale of stock. These divi-
dends are not deductible under section 243 unless they satisfy the
judicial requirement that such dividends serve a valid business pur-
pose of the distributing corporation. The restrictive attitude of these
opinions stems from judicial concern that section 243 might be used
to create artificial tax losses through distributions of pre-acquisition
earnings and profits. When the dividend distributions are made
from post-acquisition earnings and profits not reflected in the basis
of the stock, however, a parent should be permitted to use section
243 as a means of obtaining tax treatment equivalent to that result-
ing from a sale of assets. By amending section 243 to require a
reduction in basis for distributions from pre-acquisition earnings
and profits, Congress could prevent the creation of artificial tax
losses. Once the possibility of illegitimate tax avoidance under sec-
tion 243 is eliminated, judicial recognition that section 243 may be
used to effect a corporate bootstrap sale should follow.
Unless Congress amends section 243, however, the courts will
continue to scrutinize closely bootstrap sales involving intercorpor-
ate dividends. Although the opinions in Waterman, Basic, and TSN
offer little encouragement to the corporate taxpayer, they do suggest
two possible situations in which section 243 treatment would be
allowed. Basic implies that an intercorporate dividend satisfying
the "independent significance" doctrine of Dynamics Corp. of
America v. United States' 5 will qualify under section 243."11 Unfor-
tunately, this doctrine seldom would apply to a corporate bootstrap
115. 449 F.2d 402 (Ct. C1. 1971).
116. See notes 49-50 supra and accompanying text.
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acquisition because the decision to pay a dividend in this situation
is almost always dependent on the decision to sell the stock. Finally,
all three cases hold that a valid business purpose of the distributing
corporation will justify application of section 243. This solution also
is extremely limited because the declaration of a dividend as part
of a bootstrap sale ordinarily serves a business purpose of the share-
holder, not the distributing corporation. Furthermore, even if the
distributing corporation has a valid business purpose, the taxpayer
assumes the risk that other courts may follow TSN and refuse to
recognize the existence of the valid business purpose. Unless the
parties can structure a corporate bootstrap sale of stock within these
limited boundaries, a parent corporation may be effectively fore-
closed from disposing of a subsidiary through a sale of stock.
DON B. CANNADA

